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Abstract 
This paper deals with the difficult yet increasingly important MIS phenomenon of online child sexual 
exploitation (online CSE). Through the use of secondary and publicly available data from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, as well as primary data from a cybercrime police unit in the United 
Kingdom, this study takes a grounded theory approach and organizes the role that technologies and 
social actors play in shaping online CSE. The paper contributes to IS theory by providing a 
consolidated model for online CSE, which we call the technology and imagery dimensions model. 
This model combines the staging of the phenomenon and the key dimensions that depict how the use 
of technology and imagery both fuels and defuses the phenomenon. In informing the construction of 
the model, the paper extracts, organizes, and generalizes the affordances of technology and discusses 
the role of information systems in detecting online CSE. 
Keywords: Online Child Sexual Exploitation, CSE, Child Protection, Cybersecurity, Cybercrime, 
Grounded Theory 
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1 Introduction 
The exploitation of children is a disturbing topic with 
serious social repercussions (Carr, 2013). Sadly, the 
diffusion of digital technologies has been misused to 
fuel an ecosystem of activities that victimize children. 
Despite efforts from cybercrime police to counter such 
phenomena, one of the most serious forms of abuse 
online is online child sexual exploitation (hereinafter 
“online CSE”) (Jalil, 2015). Online CSE must be 
distinguished conceptually from online SE (the online 
sexual exploitation of adults), which has other 
socioeconomic vulnerability factors (e.g., 
bereavement, social exclusion, homelessness, 
immigration), stronger financial fraud elements (e.g., 
defrauding elderly of their pensions), and image 
solicitation that is dwarfed by the adult porn industry 
(Miller & Veltkamp, 1998). In this paper, we 
concentrate solely on online CSE.  
Online CSE includes activities on the internet (e.g., 
online pornography) but can also be connected to 
serious contact offenses including rape, kidnapping, 
trafficking, and murder. Yet, despite its social 
significance and the multifaceted role of technology in 
both enabling and constraining the phenomenon, the 
field of information systems (IS) has thus far not 
engaged with the study of online CSE. The study 
presented here deconstructs the connections between 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
and online CSE and explores these connections 
primarily within the organizational context of a 
cybercrime unit (CCU) in a local police department in 
the United Kingdom. The article contributes to the 
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon by 
developing a staging model for online CSE, relating it 
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to an organizational context, and by extracting, 
organizing, and generalizing the affordances of 
technology in enabling and constraining the goal-
oriented actions of offenders and cybercrime police. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: 
the second section reviews related work, the third 
section presents the methodology of the study, the 
fourth section presents our findings in relation to 
staging, and the fifth section presents our main 
findings around the use of IS in the CCU. In that 
context, affordances are extracted and generalized. The 
final section offers some conclusions about the nature 
of the phenomenon and its evolution and proposes 
future research possibilities and, indeed, research 
responsibilities for IS scholars.  
2 Related Work 
One of the key dynamics of online CSE is its 
staggering growth over the past two decades (Breeden 
and Mulholland, 2006). For example, in the United 
States, a 988% increase in arrests was witnessed 
between 2000 and 2006 (Mitchell et al., 2010). More 
recent work points to a global viral-like expansion as 
the internet has enabled increased interconnectivity 
(Calcara, 2013). In the UK, a 700% increase has been 
recorded in the number of online CSE referrals to the 
National Crime Agency between 2013 and 2019 
(NCA, 2019). Meanwhile, the security-oriented 
significance of online CSE is evident from the UK’s 
national security strategy. Online CSE is included as 
part of cybersecurity risk that, along with international 
military crises, pandemics, and terrorist incidents, is 
classified as a Tier 1 threat to the country (UKGov, 
2015).  
Despite the recognized importance of (and need for) 
more research into online CSE, the only tangential IS 
reference we could find comes from Lee’s (2015) 
editorial as president of the Association of Information 
Systems (AIS). Lee mentioned that the “Council of the 
AIS has adopted a grand vision of an ICT-Enabled 
Bright Society, with the goal of preventing undesirable 
activities on the Internet.” The internet has “become a 
minefield of crime” (p. iii) where “child protection” (p. 
ix) has become a major concern. In light of a lack of 
IS-literature dedicated to online CSE, we draw the 
main technology-oriented affordances of online CSE 
from other disciplines. This allows us to highlight the 
key characteristics of the phenomenon and to achieve 
an initial understanding of online CSE. We use the 
concept of affordances in order to help us weave a 
cross-disciplinary thread that will not only build up 
that initial understanding but will also serve to 
organize the later sections of the analysis.  
2.1 Affordances 
The concept of an affordance originates in Gibson’s 
work in the context of his ecological approach to visual 
perception (1977). Gibson used the concept of 
affordances to fence off the idea that humans (and 
other living beings) orient to objects in their 
environment and that the interaction between humans 
and objects creates possibilities for action (i.e., 
affordances). For example, a “rock may have the 
affordance, for a reptile, of being a shelter from the 
heat of the sun; or, for an insect, of concealment from 
a hunter” (Hutchby, 2001, p. 447). The appeal of this 
general form of interaction between any species and 
objects in their environment, as well as the multiplicity 
of possibilities that objects open up for interaction, has 
led to the transposition of the concept of affordances 
into IS research, which perceives the materiality of 
technological artifacts as giving rise to possibilities for 
user-computer interaction or, more generally, 
interaction between a user and any given IT-related 
artifact (which could be a software application, a social 
network, a set of features, etc).  
Thus, the use of the idea behind affordances has been 
deployed in IS research in a number of ways and 
framed as “the possibilities for goal-oriented action 
afforded to specified user groups by technical objects” 
(Markus & Silver, 2008, p. 622). As Leonardi points 
out, the key idea is that objects have properties, or 
features in the context of information technology, and 
users perceive the utility of these (i.e., what they 
afford) through user-computer interaction; naturally, 
one technology can support multiple affordances 
(Leonardi, 2013). However, affordances should not be 
perceived as freely variable. For example, “while a tree 
offers an enormous range of affordances for a vast 
variety of species, there are things a river can afford 
which the tree cannot, and vice versa” (Hutchby, 2001, 
p. 447). Hutchby (2001) also argues that technological 
materiality is both constraining and enabling. This 
distinction between enabling/constraining affordances 
can be thought of as the functional dimension of 
affordances and a very useful way of both categorizing 
and reflecting on affordances. But affordances are not 
only functional, they are also relational (Hutchby, 
2001) in the sense that affordances differ from one 
group of users to another and that different 
observers/users will perceive different affordances. In 
saying that “affordances can both enable and 
constrain” (Volkoff & Strong, 2013, p. 823), 
relationality is important. Taking the example of a 
fallen log in the woods, “someone wanting to walk 
along a path may consider a barricading affordance 
constraining, whereas someone wishing to prevent 
passage would consider it enabling” (Volkoff & 
Strong, 2013, p. 823). Thus, it is important to state that 
“affordances of an artifact are not things which impose 
themselves upon humans’ actions with, around, or via 
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that artifact. But they do set limits on what it is possible 
to do with, around, or via the artifact. By the same 
token, there is not one but a variety of ways of 
responding to the range of affordances for action and 
interaction that a technology presents” (Hutchby, 
2001, p. 453). This relationship is both open and 
bounded.  
Using these ideas, Leonardi develops a classification 
of affordances as individualized, collective, and shared 
(Leonardi, 2013). An individualized affordance is an 
affordance that someone enacts when using a 
technology’s features but that affordance is not 
common to his group; a collective affordance signals 
differential use and is collectively created by members 
of a group (e.g., a final output is created by individuals 
that work on their own, usually specialized, tasks); and 
a shared affordance denotes similar use where 
individuals in the group use technology in roughly the 
same ways. However, we would like to highlight a 
further distinction. While offenders engage in 
deliberate goal-oriented actions through which 
technology enables online CSE, at the same time, there 
is a non-offender-oriented use of technology that might 
enable online CSE but unwittingly, which would 
constitute misperceived affordances based on Gaver 
(1991). Misperceived affordances in the context of 
online CSE involve affordances that are not perceived 
by a user group although they do exist (e.g., the online 
dissemination of photographs by parents). Overall, the 
various conceptualizations of affordances assist us in 
both organizing the initial understanding of the 
phenomenon and driving the discussion of online CSE 
forward.  
2.2 The Enabling and Constraining 
Affordances of Technology in 
Online CSE 
Online CSE has been studied from several 
perspectives. Legal (Barnard-Wills, 2012), 
criminological (Tener, Wolak & Finkelhor, 2015) and 
psychiatric (Quayle & Newman, 2015) studies offer 
important insights. For example, Elliott and Beech 
(2009) find many interlocking neuropsychological 
aspects that describe offender behavior: emotional 
problems, social difficulties, cognitive distortion, and 
deviant behavior. Others focus around building 
typologies of online offenders themselves and classify 
them into two major categories: traders (where peer-
to-peer P2P networks enable users to traffic child 
pornography online) and travelers (where social media 
and other forms of interaction enable offenders to 
engage in online discussions and to coerce children for 
sexual purposes) (Alexy, Burgess & Baker, 2005). The 
behavior of young users is considered to be an 
important part of the problem. For instance, Wells and 
Mitchell (2008) found that the routine connectivity 
afforded to children who exhibit aggressive behavior 
online makes it twice as likely that these children will 
be victimized. In assessing the experiences of online 
victimization by using routine activity theory, 
Marcum, Ricketts, and Higgins (2010) described how 
children become suitable targets, mostly by providing 
personal information online. Psychologists also 
explore how the relationship between parents and 
young internet users affects the structure of online 
communications (McCarthy, 2010).  
2.3 Perpetrators and Online CSE 
Because the internet allows pedophiles to find each 
other, scholarly work has highlighted the significant 
role of child-abuse imagery and the creation of 
underground markets (Eisenstein, 2013). However, 
while different ways have been proposed to classify 
offenders (Tener et al., 2015), there is general 
agreement (Bartels & Merdian, 2016) that offenders 
should be differentiated as: (1) contact sex offenders, 
who are enabled by technology to pursue and lure their 
victims online with the intent to cause physical harm 
and crimes like child sex slavery and trafficking 
(Akullo, 2012), and (2) purely online sex offenders that 
confine their actions to the online space (Alexy et al., 
2005). However, such classifications have a 
criminological orientation and they do not explain the 
process or the stages through which either type of 
offender is enabled by technology to commit online 
CSE. As Malesky (2007) notes, purely online 
offenders may still engage in serious criminal activities 
including online extortion and distribution of child 
pornography through peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. 
Even though 62% of cases in the US involve 
possession-only offenses, child pornography is seen as 
part of a larger pattern of offending behavior involving 
a complex technological role (Owens et al., 2016).  
With most of the focus being placed on offender 
classifications per se, there is an important gap in 
exploring the broader affordances of technology in 
online CSE (both enabling and constraining). Most of 
the literature around online CSE focuses on behaviors 
and motivations, with little attention devoted to the 
constraining affordances and the contextual 
organizational aspects that would shape them. 
However, some work on P2P networks does shed some 
light upon the intensity with which online communities 
of pedophiles share content. Wolak, Liberatore, and 
Levine’s study (2014) on Gnutella measured one 
year’s worth of traffic, with the measurements focused 
on already known pornographic images of children 
that had a registered digital footprint from previous 
police investigations (each image was uniquely 
hashed). By collecting the individual IP addresses of 
users, they found that 244,920 US computers shared 
120,418 unique child pornographic files. A surprising 
finding was that the majority of users “contributed” 
only a few images and less than 1% “contributed” more 
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than 100 images. This high-volume/low-level activity 
related to image sharing shows just how widespread 
the phenomenon has become. It further emphasizes 
that even though it is clear that technology enables 
offenders to share child pornography, the specific 
function of imagery behind online CSE seems to 
occupy a more complex role. While the existing 
literature seems to portray imagery as part of the end 
goal of the phenomenon, because of its extent and 
interference, nuances of imagery play a more 
foundational role in fueling/defusing the phenomenon. 
For example, what are the challenges related to 
imagery that are faced by cybercrime police seeking to 
prevent, detect, and pursue offenders?  
2.4 Victims, Digital Imagery, and 
Online CSE 
The importance of deconstructing the role of 
technology is perhaps most evident in the conceptual 
centrality that digital imagery occupies in online CSE. 
In laying out the potential ICT research agenda for 
online CSE, Hillman et al. (2014) do mention that we 
need to understand how technology is being used by 
criminals in relation to imagery since offenders are 
enabled by imagery and technology in varying ways to 
achieve different goals. In challenging the role of 
imagery, we also see it as a dimension of interference 
for online CSE that occupies different contexts, 
institutional efforts, and organizational processes 
within teams (e.g., in cybercrime police), and shapes 
enabling/constraining or misperceived affordances. 
Since the role of imagery is also critical from a 
detection perspective, cybercrime police use different 
information systems in order to constrain online CSE, 
while the mechanism of that containment takes place 
through imagery. However, a recognition of the 
combined significance of the role of technology in 
online CSE imagery and the sociotechnical challenges 
that can be found in a cybercrime organizational 
context is largely absent. The phenomenon cannot be 
confined without a deeper understanding of how 
conditions aimed at tackling cybercrime at the 
organizational level take shape via different 
affordances. 
Unsurprisingly, the way that offender-oriented 
technology-use enables online CSE is also linked to 
how the victims approach technology as users. 
Behaviorally, scholars point out that technology use 
for children has become a significant part of their lives, 
and youngsters may even experience online 
friendships before they engage in real ones (Dowdell 
& Bradley, 2010), which may expose them to stalking, 
harassment, bullying (Smith, 2014), or even to 
pedophiles. Unfortunately, youngsters do not usually 
understand the full spectrum of risks until it is too late 
(Guan & Huck, 2012). Alas, parents can be victims, 
too, as they suffer a great deal if their children are 
targeted. But parents play another significant role in 
online CSE. As we will discuss, when parents post 
images of their children, they provide fodder for 
predators who trawl social networking sites to harvest 
imagery (Richards, 2015). As the children’s e-safety 
commissioner of Australia, Alastair MacGibbon notes, 
there are multiple challenges associated with this: 
pedophiles edit images to make them look 
pornographic, sexualize material, and conduct highly 
explicit user discussions by reposting material on 
pedophilia websites (Battersby, 2015). Based on 
Richards (2015), as much as half of the material found 
on pedophilia websites is sourced or stolen from 
parents innocently posting images of their families 
online. This also creates a sense of “permanence once 
abusive images have been distributed online” and can 
be trafficked into perpetuity (von Weiler, Haardt-
Becker & Schulte, 2010, p. 211). The role of imagery 
(including video) is critical for both fueling online CSE 
(Quayle & Newman, 2015) and for detecting it 
(Wolak, Liberatore, & Levine, 2014). However, there 
is considerable fragmentation associated with the 
examination of this problem, presenting the need to 
move toward more integrative approaches 
(Livingstone, 2008). We summarize the key preceding 
insights in Table 1 and present the key characteristics 
for the problematization of the phenomenon (following 
Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011 in Table A1 in the 
Appendix). 
Despite the variety of approaches used to study online 
CSE and the different classifications abstracted from 
criminology and other disciplines, there is an important 
research gap in the delineation of technology-oriented 
aspects of online CSE. Based on the preceding 
discussion, it becomes evident that while it is known 
that technology enables online CSE and that it also 
constrains it, a deeper analysis into how that takes 
place is missing. It is not clear how the activities that 
offenders undertake by using technology are connected 
with each other and how the centrality of imagery 
affects different stages. Thus, it becomes clear that 
whatever IS theoretical development is being pursued, 
this must be sensitive, theoretically, to the inclusion of 
imagery and a deconstruction of the stages through 
which such use is facilitated. Imagery is also important 
in delineating how the UK cybercrime unit (CCU) 
tackles the phenomenon; thus, we expect a number of 
affordances (enabling and constraining) to be focused 
around imagery.  
While studies similar to Wolak et al (2014) monitor 
peer-to-peer networks, no IS study has been conducted 
that explores the role of information systems in 
tackling online CSE within an organizational context. 
In order to address these gaps, while accepting the 
central role of imagery for both offenders and for those 
tasked with its prevention and detection, we focus on 
deconstructing the relationship between online CSE 
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and technology by (1) taking into account the centrality 
of imagery and delineating the process through which 
imagery is being used, and (2) extracting the enabling 
and constraining affordances of technology in online 
CSE, informed by the organizational context of a UK 
police cybercrime unit (CCU). How do technology and 
imagery enable and constrain online CSE for offenders 
and the CCU? How can the process of online CSE be 
delineated if we assume that imagery affects different 
stages of the process? In order to elucidate these 
aspects, we focus on the IS implications of the 
phenomenon in the organizational context of the 
cybercrime unit of a UK police department. 
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3 Methodology 
As we seek to understand online CSE from an IS 
perspective, we use both secondary data (from FBI 
cases prosecuted in the US) and primary empirical data 
(from a cybercrime unit in the UK) in order to address 
aspects (1) and (2) presented in the previous section. 
Given the close cooperation between the US and the 
UK, the direct reporting of IP addresses from the US 
to the UK on UK-based suspects, and the multi-
jurisdictional nature of the online phenomenon, a 
US/UK perspective can capture online CSE challenges 
in a more meaningful way. Also, given that offenders 
in the US and the UK use the same social media and 
other platforms operated by US tech companies, and 
given that offenders across borders collaborate in 
underground forums (Quayle & Newman, 2015), a 
degree of homogeneity in online CSE can be expected 
(at least in terms of how technology and imagery 
would enable or constrain it). For crimes conducted 
mostly in an online environment, jurisdiction becomes 
less important for the phenomenon’s emergence, 
though it remains critical for prosecution and in terms 
of committing resources to its prevention and 
detection.  
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The research follows an interpretivist epistemology 
(Walsham, 1995; Klein & Myers, 1999) and an 
inductive reasoning underpinned by a grounded theory 
approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). Grounded theory allows us to both develop the 
context behind our phenomenon and strive for an 
explanation (Orlikowski, 1993). The goal is to move 
toward theoretical development (Corbin & Strauss, 
2007, p. 107) as “current understanding of the 
phenomenon is severely limited due to a lack of 
theoretical and empirical research in the area” (Martin, 
2014, p. 96). Thus, theory is generated during research 
and grounded in data from the field, especially in the 
“actions, interactions and social processes of people” 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 84). In these inductive studies, the 
construction of theories or conceptual models occurs 
through the structured analysis of data (Martin & 
Turner, 1986).  
Based on the goals of the research and given that 
theoretical sensitivity is increased when informed by 
the literature (Glaser, 1978, p. 3), we have adjusted the 
theoretical sensitivity of our grounded theory approach 
by focusing on the process through which imagery is 
being used in online CSE (since the centrality of 
imagery is pivotal and used by offenders at the core of 
the phenomenon and cybercrime police for detection 
purposes). Furthermore, we extract the relevant 
affordances of technology in online CSE (Gibson, 
1977; Markus & Silver, 2008; Volkoff & Strong, 
2018). This helps us organize, develop, and abstract 
our understanding of the phenomenon and reflect on 
the corresponding affordances of technology. With the 
exception of the significance of imagery that we knew 
was critical for the phenomenon itself, we held no 
preconceived ideas regarding the development of our 
framework. The combination of both the public cases 
and the interviews conducted (Table 2) led to the 
development of rich data. 
In the first phase of our research (Phase 1), we built up 
our staging model, abbreviated as TIDM (technology 
and imagery dimensions model) from 37 public cases of 
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).1 In the 
first coding stages, the active engagement with the data 
led to some key categories on the use of technology for 
(1) image solicitation or distribution, reflecting the 
centrality of imagery in online CSE as described in the 
literature review; (2) social network participation (or 
other channel of use), reflecting the ways in which social 
networks are being used by both offenders and victims; 
(3) how criminals used technology to facilitate online 
CSE, and (4) user implications. A case sample is given 
in Appendix B, and a sample of five coded cases is 
presented in Table C1 in the Appendix. Recoding and 
 
1  This sample was selected on the basis of secured 
convictions in cases corresponding to FBI field offices in 
Miami, Detroit, San Francisco, Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, 
category malleability were shaped through visual 
collaborative mind-mapping; we used visual data 
coding through a mind-mapping web application 
(Coggle), as it allowed us to connect and collaborate and 
discuss the categories created while its interactive 
visualizations allowed us to explore the underlying data. 
This iterative process, whereby data are compared with 
emerging categories/codes, data are compared with 
data, and codes are compared with codes is known as 
constant comparison. Achieving constant comparison 
visually allowed us to develop more interesting 
interconnections (Charmaz, 2014), to benefit from a 
higher degree of malleability by moving branches of the 
codes around, to reexamine data, and to combine or 
enrich the categories. This process continued into Phase 
2 of our study as well. We illustrate different time slices 
of this process in Table C1. This process enabled us to 
go through the open, axial, and selective coding stages, 
and Coggle’s timeline features allowed us to go back in 
time, explore modifications, and rebuild our model. We 
stopped adding further FBI cases when we no longer 
made significant changes to the TIDM model, signaling 
that saturation was achieved. 
In the second phase of our research (Phase 2), we sought 
to connect and contextualize our TIDM model in an 
organizational context, gain a broader understanding of 
online CSE, and extract the different affordances. For 
these reasons, we conducted primary data collection in 
a specialist cybercrime unit (CCU). Detection attempts 
revolved around different uses of technology and 
imagery, which helped us anchor our UK fieldwork in 
the CCU onto the TIDM model. For our primary UK 
data collection, we interviewed 14 specialists and 
participated in four observation sessions with a total of 
64 participants. We include the details of interviewees 
and the observation from the cybercrime unit and from 
other organizations in Table 2. The interviews were 
open ended so as to capture a wide spectrum of 
technology and imagery-related aspects in line with our 
grounded theory approach. The average duration of 
interviews was 1.5 hours; observation sessions lasted 
two hours in the context of the online safeguarding 
children boards at the local council (with the exception 
of one that lasted 4.5 hours). Because of the sensitivity 
of the domain, it was requested that we use no audio and 
interviewees were made aware that all 
names/institutions would be anonymized. Notes were 
taken during the collection of empirical data and refined 
immediately after for completion. No victim imagery 
was shown or accessed by the researchers throughout 
this study, no online access was granted to specialized 
online tools, and all of our primary data came solely 
from interviews or discussions with experts.  
Washington DC, San Diego, Baltimore, Los Angeles, New 
York, Detroit, and Chicago. 
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Table 2: Primary Data Collection Sources and Scope 
# Interviews (I) & Observations (O) Scope 
1 (I) Two individuals from a large 
nonprofit focused on internet safety for 
children 
Interviews on the general domain of online abuse and impact on children. 
(interviews conducted online) 
2 (I) Two individuals from the 
Safeguarding Children Board of Local 
Council 2 
Positions of interviewees were designated as “Internet Lead” and 
“Manager” of the Safeguarding Children Board of Local Council 2. General 
discussion  
3 (I) Former director of intelligence at the 
National Crime Agency (NCA) 
Strategic, technological and resource challenges in tackling online CSE & 
evolution of Phenomenon (two follow-up interviews on coordination for 
tackling online CSE) 
4 (I) Detective Inspector X at Local Police 
Force 1  
Policing child sexual exploitation/pursuing investigations  
Follow-up interview on statistics for CSE 
5 (I) Detective Chief Inspector Y at Local 
Police Force 1 
Management challenges of CSE, evolution of investigations, indicators 
6 (I) Detective inspector specialist at 
cybercrime unit (CCU) 
Combatting online CSE, policing, investigations, forensics, imagery 
at Local Police Force 1 (CCU) 
7 (O) 21 Participants – closed (i.e., 
private/invited)  
6-hour session (cyberculture, online exploitation, online education, 
awareness) – training session on online CSE at Local Council 2 
8 (I) Police and crime commissioner (PCC)  Challenges faced when tackling CSE at Local Council 2 
9 (O) 11 Participants – public session on 
online CSE awareness (Local Council 2) 
Police training, prison system, national working group on tackling CSE, 
young persons' risk 
10 (O) 12 Participants – two closed sessions Technologies and social networks related to online CSE and school liaison 
roles at Online Strategy Group of Safeguarding Children Board (Local 
Council 1) 
11 (O) 20 Participants – closed (i.e., 
private/invited) session on online CSE  
Child safety in schools (handling IT systems for schools and the deployment 
of a new filtering tool as well as e-safety training) in Local Council 1 
12 (I) Former director of intelligence (NCA) Strategic issues around the deployment of information systems around 
online CSE and managing future challenges 
13 (I) Detective inspector (CCU) Role of the Protection of Vulnerable People (PVP) Command in online CSE 
and information systems being used  
14 (I) Detective inspector (manager of CCU) Managing online CSE work through different information systems (focusing 
on the TARGET and FILTER information systems) 
15 (I) Civilian attaché to CCU (triage 
manager) 
Use of information systems in handling and managing the triage process of 
online CSE related material (focusing on the INITIATE information system) 
16 (I) Detective inspector (digital forensics 
manager at CCU) 
Use of information systems in the digital forensics process of online CSE 
The integration of the data from Phase 2 allowed us to 
combine our TIDM model with organizational 
considerations from an IS perspective. It also reinforced 
the categories created from the FBI cases while allowing 
us to refine the dimensions of imagery and technology, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. The rich data/notes from the 
interviews and the insights from the FBI cases were first 
organized into separate MS Word documents and then 
combined for integration, sorting, writing memos and 
reflections on interviewee comments, and refining the 
conceptual categories, before extracting a complete list 
of technological affordances. In a recursive manner, 
these led to an expansion of the visual mind map as well 
(see time slices in Figure D1 in the Appendix). A few of 
our notes led to more data collection and additional 
interviews (particularly in the latter stages of the 
research that involved the digital forensics team). This 
added to our understanding and expanded the extracted 
affordances. Finally, the full list of affordances allowed 
us to refine the TIDM model further. A diagram of our 
grounded theory approach is shown in Figure E1 in the 
Appendix.  
4 Technology & Imagery: Two 
Main Drivers of Online CSE 
Based on our primary and secondary data, we now 
focus on discussing our findings. Here we discuss 
imagery and technology for offenders, and then the 
role of children and parents. Then, we present and 
analyze the different characteristics of our 
technological and imagery dimensions model.  
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4.1 Imagery and Technology in Online 
CSE: Offenders 
Offenders use technology and imagery in a number of 
different ways. They either manipulate photographs by 
using image-editing software, distribute child 
pornography (e.g., through P2P networks, pedophile 
online groups, dark web), and/or create first-generation 
images (i.e., original imagery). An additional element 
that we found to be critical in online child exploitation 
is that of time. Based on the FBI cases we analyzed, 
months or even years might go into developing online 
trust to lure victims; this was also confirmed by 
Interviewees #4 and #5. In one case, the offender had 
pursued the victim for 2.5 years before sexualized 
imagery was divulged by the victim. Offenders also use 
imagery to gain the trust of victims and to mask their 
online identity. Between offenders, the exchange of 
imagery has evolved; based on our interviews with the 
police (#4, #5, #6) but also the observation sessions, 
offenders develop, build on, and adjust an online 
“esoteric language structure.” An example was given by 
#6, who narrated an online discussion between 
pedophiles. One asked: “Have you got PTHC?”—and 
the other retorted “Sure.” Then the police officer told us 
that this was “their code for Pre-Teen Hard Core” and it 
would often be seen split further in longer sentences to 
escape algorithmic detection on a keyword-basis (e.g., 
“Participate this coming Tuesday and don’t forget to 
Help those less fortunate this Christmas”). Despite some 
efforts to issue warnings to users (e.g., if a user were to 
search on Google for “child pornography” they would 
be warned that they may be reported) and some 
encouraging results that pedophile searching online has 
dropped through traditional search engines, our 
interviews indicate (predominantly #2, #4, #6, #7) that 
this activity has been pushed to the dark web. There, it 
is much more difficult to follow (#6). Even an accidental 
discovery of a virtual machine (VM) from a confiscated 
laptop examined forensically by the CCU, led to a ten-
month investigation that has not yet unraveled the dark-
web activity of the offender who was receiving Bitcoin 
payments for child pornography. Our interviewees 
suggested that it is mostly intelligence agencies that 
have the capacity to explore such activities but, without 
direct access, we could not verify the circumstances of 
the role of intelligence agencies in online CSE.  
4.2 Imagery and Technology in Online 
CSE: Children and Parents 
Our data suggest that the way in which young users and 
parents use technology fuels the growth of online CSE. 
Since this is not their intention, we treat this as a set of 
misperceived enabling affordances. Based on several 
interviewees and observation sessions (#2, #7, #9, #10), 
we found that young users tend to ignore advice and/or 
misuse technology. The examples given to us included 
young people (1) routinely violating the terms and 
conditions of social networks, (2) lying about their age 
to gain access, (3) creating online profiles despite age-
appropriate notifications, (4) behaving irresponsibly 
online with an attitude that is shaped by the average age 
of their exposure to pornography (estimated at ten years 
old in the UK), (5) displaying an apathy toward privacy 
online (reinforced by how parents behave online).  
In this context, web-based relationships replace real 
relationships and increase risks for children. According 
to #2, the act of children sharing naked photographs of 
themselves has been normalized so much in web-based 
relationships that children refer to them as “just 
pictures.” Failing to realize the consequences of image 
distribution and data permanence online makes young 
users easier targets for serious criminals. Illustrating 
such young user attitudes and behavior was a local 
council initiative that provided a custom-built “safe 
online networking platform” for students, which was 
abandoned since young users would “refuse to lock 
down their profiles and privacy settings” (based on both 
Interviewee #2 and #1). Furthermore, as large circles of 
“friends” demonstrate popularity, discussions in 
Observation Session #7 corroborated that young users 
“purchase” online friends from online services that sell 
followers, likes, comments, etc., for Facebook, 
Instagram, and other social networks. As an example, 
$16 would buy 300 Facebook friends and get 100 likes, 
all delivered within 2-3 days. These are provided by 
“digital sweatshops,” with workers “befriending” users 
when an order comes in. Of course, young users who are 
desperate to grow their online following are easy prey 
for predators. As #6 suggested, children could be 
targeted based on their number of friends and their 
perceived popularity. The data suggested that more 
popular children, measured by a higher number of 
online friends, were targeted more. Another accelerating 
factor is how parents use technology. Parents generally 
lack “e-parenting” skills and (over)share imagery of 
their children across multiple social networks. This is 
the raw material that is exploited further. As clarified by 
#3, while parents cannot usually contemplate why 
someone would download images of their children, the 
answer often remains: “because they’re available.”  
Based on our interviews with #1, #2 and #8 as well as 
observation sessions #9, #10, we identified several 
interconnected elements related to oversharing parents 
recursively fueling online CSE: (1) legitimate photos 
that were uploaded by parents are downloaded, 
sexualized and recirculated as online pornography; (2) 
as children cannot give consent, parents are effectively 
violating the privacy of their children by posting online; 
(3) they further cultivate the apathy of children toward 
online privacy (desensitization), which makes children 
more vulnerable to future victimization; (4) location-
sensitive information may be part of a photograph’s 
metadata and children can be targeted for contact sex 
offenses; (5) phenomena like cyberbullying often use 
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imagery from parent profiles; (6) the comingling of fake 
pornographic imagery (as an unintended consequence of 
parental posting) with first-generation imagery (i.e., 
original imagery of novel cases) and second-generation 
imagery (i.e., imagery recirculating from previous 
cases) creates detection challenges for cybercrime 
authorities.  
5 Stages of Technological Use in 
Online CSE  
Based on our grounded theory approach, we identify 
four key stages that underpin the centrality of imagery 
in relation to technological use (see Figure 1). These 
stages are initiation of contact, trust development, 
online extortion, and trafficking. They revolve around 
technology and imagery, two dimensions that are 
structurally coupled. Through the use of imagery, 
technology affords online CSE by supporting the goal-
oriented action of offenders.  
5.1 Stage 1: Initiation of Contact 
At this stage, offenders use different social networks, 
web applications, and platforms with the goal to 
initiate contact with potential victims (Dimension 1). 
To support that goal, offenders require a proxy virtual 
identity to create distance from their real identity 
(cybercriminals call this “taking care of their own 
operational security” based on #3). In turn, as shown 
in Dimension 2, offenders require real/fake images to 
convince their victims of their proxy identity and 
conduct digital deception. As the goal is to lure 
children into producing and sharing authentic nude 
photos, this creates a recursivity that fuels the growth 
of the phenomenon. The reverse is also possible, 
although rarer: children seek out random connections 
themselves and volunteer nude imagery. As mentioned 
by #2: “remember when our parents used to say don't 
speak to strangers? Now children seek out to speak to 
strangers all the time through such (web) applications.” 
Meanwhile, the exploitation of platforms by tech-
savvy pedophiles has escalated. There is evidence of 
bots being programmed to lure children. They initiate 
contact by posting an appealing message; they then 
sign-off and let an offender on another platform take 
over. Based on #5, “in prison it is known that 
pedophiles buy/sell addresses of vulnerable children in 
exchange for cigarettes, but in the online world, they 




Figure 1. The Preliminary Technology & Imagery Dimensions Model (TIDM) of Online CSE  
(Depicting Only the Offenders’ Side) 
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5.2 Stage 2: Trust Development 
At this stage, the goal-oriented action of offenders is 
gaining the trust of their victims, often over long 
periods of time (Dimension 1). In one of the FBI cases, 
a twelve-year-old received 1200 messages over a two-
year period. While imagery becomes critical in trust 
development (Dimension 2), the techniques being used 
by offenders to gain trust vary, with location-tagging 
perceived to be more dangerous, as victims can be 
targeted for more serious, in-person crimes. An 
example from the FBI cases is the “new kid on the 
block” technique (Dimension 1), where offenders will 
pretend to be young children themselves that have just 
moved into the area. The act of “checking in” at a 
location nearby creates a false sense of trust. The 
critical role of how digital imagery affects this stage 
must be highlighted. For offenders to fulfill their goal 
and make potential victims feel comfortable, they will 
proactively offer nude images of their “online persona” 
(Dimension 2). While real images might be used as 
well, the sexualization of harvested images of children 
seems to be more dominant at this stage, with use of 
face-swap software and AI-based deepfakes 
(Kietzmann et al., 2020), allowing offenders to create 
photorealistic imagery easily (Dimension 1). 
Overlaying a child’s naked body over multiple faces 
allows offenders to create multiple proxy-identities for 
the parallel exploitation of different victims. The 
overabundance of children’s photos (Dimension 2) 
makes this stage much easier for offenders.  
5.3 Stage 3: Online Extortion and 
Threatening Behavior 
Once victims are convinced to expose nude photographs 
of themselves, offenders engage in threatening behavior 
and online extortion. Offenders may start posting “soft” 
material that exposes the victim on public websites or 
social networks (Dimension 1), divulge intimate 
conversations, or even threaten to kill the victims or kill 
their family members if their demands are not met. 
According to #1, this “constitutes a state of suspended 
humiliation or anxiety” that is extremely difficult for a 
young person to cope with. Victims may remain 
“compliant” for some time before they ask for help. The 
outcome is a highly disproportional relationship between 
the number of victims and the number of explicit images 
produced (Dimension 2). In one example from the FBI 
cases, a 12-year-old girl in the online extortion stage 
uploaded 660 sexually explicit images of herself to a 
cloud-based storage account controlled by a 25-year-old 
perpetrator before asking for help. In some cases, help is 
never sought. For offenders, the main goal is to maintain 
a continuous supply of explicit imagery (Dimension 2). 
Based on our interviews, this pattern is broken if the 
offender seeks to commit more serious sex crimes, 
including kidnapping, murder, rape, child trafficking, 
and organ removal for the illegal transplants market.  
5.4 Stage 4: Trafficking 
At this stage, offenders are enabled by P2P networks, 
the dark web, proprietary forums, and their goal-
orientation is trafficking child pornography 
(Dimension 2). In addition to the secret groups that 
offenders use to exchange illegal images through 
otherwise legitimate social networks, we were also told 
of the existence of “elite child-pornographic networks” 
(Dimension 1) where online access is “bought.” The 
centrality of imagery comes into focus here, as it is the 
pornographic images of children themselves that are 
being used as a virtual currency. Based on our 
interviews (#3, #4), the buy-in threshold of access 
varies, though we were told of one example of a 
network requiring a minimum of 2,000 images as an 
ante. The use of illicit child imagery as tokens in such 
underground economies is what prompts aspiring 
“elite” pedophiles to make up for the difference in 
images that they do not hold in their possession.  
Thus, these individuals engage in the practice of 
harvesting photographs of children from social 
networks and other web-based sources and 
manipulating them so that they appear pornographic. 
Alteration of imagery serves the double purpose of 
establishing fake online identities (Stage 1) and 
gaining token-based access to elite networks for 
trafficking (Stage 4). Monetization is also a factor here. 
As #6 mentioned, we are entering a “space where 
requesting payments in Bitcoins or creating new 
online-CSE-related digital currencies like pedopoints 
might become the future norm.” This reinforces 
Westlake’s description of criminal careers in 
cyberspace. Based on the interview with #6, the case 
of Richard Huckle was mentioned as an example at this 
stage. Huckle, having abused more than 200 children 
himself, had thousands of images and videos depicting 
child abuse in his possession (mostly first-generation 
imagery). Given the complexity of this one case, the 
associated digital forensics analyses and the 
investigation took almost a year before Huckle could 
be arrested. To make matters worse, Huckle had used 
technology to develop an online community and to 
award “pedopoints” (a virtual token) based on other 
offenders sharing evidence of their successful 
exploitation of children (Dimension 1). If offenders 
were not advancing on Huckle’s leaderboard, they 
were banned from the forum. Huckle had “gamified” 
online CSE and he was using child imagery as a 
tradable currency (Dimension 2) within a small 
criminal community of trust. He had even drawn plans 
to monetize them in exchange for Bitcoins just before 
his arrest at Heathrow Airport. Huckle was convicted 
in 2016 for 71 counts of serious sexual assaults against 
children. In that context, cryptocurrencies, the dark 
web, the overabundance of photographs of children 
that can be manipulated, and unsafe online behaviors 
across all social networking platforms fuel the 
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dynamics of online CSE (Dimension 1). This creates a 
challenging context for the cybercrime police at the 
CCU. The next section discusses these challenges 
before relating them to the TIDM model.  
6 Law Enforcement Information 
Systems Used to Fight Online 
CSE 
In exploring online CSE in the organizational context 
of the cybercrime unit (CCU), it became evident that a 
variety of information systems were used to counter 
the phenomenon. We differentiate between peripheral 
IS that can be used in online CSE investigations and 
core IS that are essential. We have anonymized the 
names of several IS where necessary.  
6.1 Peripheral Law Enforcement IS 
Used in the Fight Against Online 
CSE 
As an example of peripheral IS for online CSE, two 
information systems used by the police are Watson and 
HOLMES 2. While we were told that the HOLMES 2 
would only overlap with online CSE if a murder was 
also recorded, Watson is an analytical tool that is 
capable of linking intelligence with suspects, criminal 
groups, and locations. However, based on #6, who has 
been investigating cases of online CSE for nearly a 
decade, the collection of intelligence for suspects is 
scattered across different IS. Combining intelligence 
from many different sources (schools, health, and 
social services, public, police support services2) for a 
fuller picture of a suspect is time consuming and 
challenging. While there are some interoperable 
systems, a detective looking to develop a 
comprehensive profile of a suspect would need to 
combine intelligence and access different systems. To 
counter that fragmentation, #4 mentioned that he was 
“forced to develop” an Excel spreadsheet on his own 
so that he could “register different bits and pieces for 
CSE suspects” and “provide end-of-year CSE statistics 
to his superiors.” Recognizing this, #5 said that the ICT 
strategy of the Association of Chief Police Officers 
recognized “that the police service in England and 
Wales can no longer afford to treat ICT as isolated 
programs of work developed and operated 
independently by separate organizations.”  
A more extreme variant of this problem was discussed 
by #13, who mentioned that between two critical teams 
for online CSE3, there was no meaningful channel of 
communication. For instance, based on #13, one team 
 
2  An example of this within the UK Police is the PVP 
department for the Protection of Vulnerable People that may 
have information about children that might need to be 
safeguarded and where online CSE could be a consideration.  
might be investigating a possible child abuse case but 
lack the technology skills that would enable it to 
identify online CSE as an additional criminal 
dimension. Based on an observation session (#10), this 
was identified as a broader issue of organizational 
disconnect. As mentioned by #13, there are “different 
command areas” that are “not joined up” and this raises 
a broader child safeguarding issue. While the CCU is 
at the core of handling ongoing cyberrisks, 
safeguarding children transcends many different 
departments within the police and also involves 
external stakeholders. For instance, in observation 
session #11, the deployment of filtering tools was 
discussed for schools. The head of IT services for all 
schools in the local community explained how a new 
software “picked up keywords that might indicate 
specific vulnerabilities” related to online CSE. She 
mentioned that some online searches of children at 
schools were “bringing up some horrendous hits—
some really severe hits.” While this school filtering 
tool has been “working for about a month at an 
experimental level at only seven schools,” it became 
clear that the manual review of the volume of red flags 
is beyond the capability of any school. A full-scale 
deployment would require a clear policy of how cases 
should be prioritized. Despite the clear and agreed-
upon need to deal with online CSE in a risk-based 
approach, the sporadic implementation of many 
different and disconnected technologies makes such 
initiatives increasingly difficult. 
6.2 Core Law Enforcement IS used in 
the Fight Against Online CSE 
Of course, technology is not only used by those who 
break the law, but also by those trying to uphold it and 
pursue offenders. Our study revealed a combination of 
different, at times overlapping core law enforcement 
IS. These include network monitoring systems, data 
filtering systems, systems developed to triage and 
prioritize the severity of images and offenders, risk-
assessment tools, and specialist digital forensics. In the 
following subsections, we discuss these systems and 
evaluate how cybercrime officers are enabled and 
constrained by these systems in their fight against 
online CSE. 
6.2.1 Law Enforcement IS 1: Network 
Monitoring 
While the streamlining of communications is 
challenging in the context of online CSE, there remain 
core IS that enable officers to identify first-generation 
3 One being the Internet Sex Offenders team and the other 
being the PVP (Protection of Vulnerable People) team.  
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imagery and pursue offenders who have a higher 
probability of being contact sex offenders (first-
generation imagery is associated with potential 
“ongoing victims”). In this context, one of the core IS 
used to tackle online CSE is the INFOTRACK system 
(our alias) that is handled at the national level and 
administered by UK law enforcement.4 INFOTRACK 
monitors peer-to-peer networks for file exchanges. It 
identifies and collects imagery to be investigated 
further. Part of this mechanism includes filtering out 
those images that are second generation (i.e., that have 
been recirculated). This initial determination is 
achieved through the use of a database called CAID 
(Child Abuse Imagery Database), which became fully 
operational in December 2014. This database contains 
hashes of known child imagery in circulation. Thus, 
when an image is collected by a P2P network, it is 
hashed by an algorithm. When the hash is identical to 
an entry in the CAID database, this image will be 
recognized as a second-generation image that has been 
previously circulated/evaluated. While the trafficking 
of second-generation images remains an offense, it is 
considered to be low risk for purely follow-up 
investigatory classification purposes. While image 
alteration (even by a single pixel) would result in a 
different hash altogether, the application of specialist 
image recognition software would attempt to 
(re)classify these photos further based on previous 
photos in circulation. One such example is PhotoDNA, 
developed and provided free-of-charge by Microsoft. 
The deployment of INFOTRACK along with the 
complementary use of image recognition has brought 
additional demands regarding how technology can be 
used. An example is the “additional need for police 
officers in the field who are now photographing empty 
rooms of offenders” (#16). The physical characteristics 
of known rooms in which offenses have occurred 
might be linked (through image recognition) to 
previously trafficked images and cases of exploitation. 
Thus, if the offender used the same physical space to 
conduct/record their activities, previously unresolved 
cases of victims and corresponding imagery could be 
associated with that offender. However, all of the first-
generation images have to be reviewed, one by one, by 
police officers who evaluate the seriousness of the 
depicted abuse and categorize first-generation imagery 
at the level of local police forces in the UK. At the risk 
of stating the obvious, this is probably the most 
stressful task required of any IS user group, as these 
individuals have to “view gruesome images of child 
abuse as their day-to-day job” (#16) and then feed their 
results back to the database (in case the same image 
recirculates in the future). While some sporadic 
technical glitches have hampered the work of police 
 
4 More specifically, by the National Crime Agency, where 
the Child Exploitation and Online Protection center is based 
(known also as CEOP). 
officers because the “connection might have a 
problem” or the “speed of processing varies,” the users 
generally view the INFOTRACK system favorably. It 
has enabled them to reduce the processing time and 
largely lifted the burden of verifying second-
generation imagery that remains the “vast majority and 
accounts for probably more than 90% of the imagery 
trafficked” (#14). Through INFOTRACK, users 
conduct computer-assisted/manual first-generation 
imagery classification, risk-scoring, and offender 
profiling.  
Additional constraints are that INFOTRACK “is not a 
permanently-on connection and it focuses on P2P 
networks only” (#13). The rest of the leads are referrals 
from technology companies. As #14 mentions, the 
“main ones that we have at the moment come from 
KikMe, Facebook, and Dropbox, but we get referrals 
from many.” This was the subject of a more general 
discussion with several interviewees who felt that 
technology companies at large are not doing enough to 
address the phenomenon. However, some relationships 
between the police and internet service providers 
(ISPs), as well as different technology companies are, 
at times, challenging. First, although some national 
police authorities seek to develop software for 
reporting child online abuse, their operations are 
typically not supported by technology companies. For 
example, the UK’s national center for Child 
Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) developed 
an online abuse button that could be integrated across 
different social networks and websites. However, we 
were told that Facebook declined to integrate it (#2, #3) 
because it uses other internal measures and ways for 
users to report abuse, which can then be forwarded to 
the police (#4). Also, a number of hashes from the 
CAID database are fed back into technology 
companies so that the images can be removed. 
However, without research access to Facebook itself 
(or other social networks), we cannot determine the 
nature of the enabling/constraining affordances their 
analysts would encounter. Second, collaboration with 
ISPs is not always straightforward and involves 
variable degrees of cooperation. Based on #6, means 
of strengthening such collaborations and establishing 
better processes for data exchange need to be explored 
further. For instance, hardware black-box filtering at 
the ISP level is one countermeasure that could be 
explored to enable monitoring, though its application 
would (and should) be constrained by strict privacy 
safeguards, as misappropriation and surveillance 
would need to be factored into any decision-making.  
This reflection of further countermeasures extends to 
the police as well. Based on different interviewees (#3, 
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#7, #12, #18), it is evident that the police’s use of 
INFOTRACK is reactive, even though proactive 
techniques that “sniff out potential offenders” (#16) 
would be more effective. For instance, police officers 
assume ghost virtual identities online when they 
pretend to be children themselves and chat online with 
potential offenders. The use of proxy identities online 
then is a shared affordance between offenders/police, 
as behavioral mirroring through technological 
appropriation offers the potential of unearthing 
offenders. We were also told of “online vigilantes that 
do the same thing and then report to police” (#6), 
though these seem to be limited occurrences.  
6.2.2  Law Enforcement IS 2: Data Filtering 
Since the challenges and the dynamic language 
structures that offenders use to “find themselves 
online” (#12) have escaped detection thus far, the 
current development of countermeasures involves real-
time proactive filtering. As the emphasis is changing, 
we were informed of the experimental deployment of 
the HARVEST (our alias) information system. This 
involved a real-time filtering solution that was tuned to 
“listen to social media by fixed search keywords that 
were set by the police” (#16). The goal was to deliver 
intelligence on online CSE and develop an automated 
identification mechanism for high-risk classifiers (e.g., 
gender). While a sample profile was not disclosed, we 
discussed the organizational consequences resulting 
from the use of the HARVEST system. In the trial, the 
“overwhelming majority (of suspects) was 
meaningless” (#6) and, eventually, the police had to 
“shut the system down completely,” as the 
examination of false positives consumed valuable 
resources.  
Based on nearly all interviewees, the top challenge 
associated with the use of technology in online CSE 
can be summarized as a “coping with the data deluge” 
problem. While initiatives like the database of hashed 
second-generation imagery (CAID) have helped 
considerably and allowed the “force to focus on the 
quick identification of victims,” the “massive data 
dumps from across the world” (#3) are daunting and 
pose significant challenges for any police force. Over 
the last few years, the resources demanded by this 
phenomenon have increased dramatically. In fact, at a 
moment in time when UK forces are experiencing 
budget reductions and crime has seen a 10% increase 
throughout the country, there are two growth areas that 
have become critical in policing: cybercrime and 
online CSE (according to #3). Whereas back in 2005, 
there were about 10,000-20,000 images related to child 
pornography and abuse, #2 estimated that there are 
currently 26 million images for the UK alone. This 
rough estimate and official reports of images “in the 
millions” (CEOP 2016) shows the scale of the 
challenge. For example, as we were told by #3, in one 
of the massive streams of data, in just one day, the UK 
received 100,000 distinct IP addresses and related 
images from the US-based National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children. While this was a “burst of 
activity” that did not represent average daily 
operations, it serves to illustrate how swiftly these 
challenges can escalate. The IP addresses were passed 
onto the UK command and the images were compared 
with hashed versions of second-generation images. 
Based on approximate geolocation, the IPs were 
forwarded to the 45 police forces in the UK, where the 
abuse images were assessed, ranked, and prioritized 
and suspects evaluated. The challenges involved in this 
process are many.  
As the CCU says (based on #6), the unit receives IP 
addresses and some basic information about the 
indecent imagery that has been detected. In that 
context, the CCU submits further requests with ISPs in 
order to identify individuals behind such IP addresses 
and pursue their investigation. Occasionally, the 
simplest of technical issues would create a butterfly 
effect down the chain of investigations. For instance, 
one of the issues mentioned by #12 and #13 was that 
sometimes there is an issue with wrong IP addresses 
being recorded as part of the monitoring mechanism. 
If a router refreshes its IP address (e.g., restarts), the 
old IP address that was linked to illegal trafficking 
could be assigned to someone else and the 
“intelligence analyst assigned to the case may take it 
as far as a warrant … someone may get a knock on the 
door and have his equipment seized and it might take 
some time to analyze their devices before we realize 
we’ve got the wrong person … on another occasion, 
we ended up in an empty building due to a mix-up with 
the physical address … if there are many people in a 
house then we have to check for the GUIDs [Globally 
Unique Identifiers] (#14).” While the aforementioned 
examples are exceptions, there is a general 
acknowledgment that there are “several issues with IP 
resolution at a national level” (#15). Most of the time, 
the challenge is the sheer volume of imagery to be 
examined. Once INFOTRACK helps separate first- 
and second-generation imagery, the question becomes 
how the first-generation images will be analyzed by 
cybercrime police and how offenders will be 
prioritized. Several IS are used throughout these 
phases. In this context, we must remember that 
offender-driven demand for imagery, as delineated in 
our TIDM model (setting up proxy identities, 
establishing trust between offenders/victims, etc), all 
fuel the data deluge around this problem.  
6.2.3 Law Enforcement IS 3: Online CSE 
Triage  
Precisely due to the volume of data and images to be 
handled, there is a separate data triage process that 
aims to prioritize cases on two fronts: (1) the severity 
of images, and (2) the profile of the offender. In the 
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context of the first front, triage is conducted using the 
INITIATE information system (our alias). Once a 
warrant has been executed, the confiscated devices are 
brought to the CCU for the triage process; this is not a 
full forensic examination that would stand up in court 
(which would be handled by the forensics department), 
but represents another layer of prioritization. 
According to the manager of the triage department, the 
team’s role works “much like a hospital triage process 
and tries to get the critical cases quickly to the 
forensics department so that the offender can be 
pursued in court … however, there is a backlog and a 
massive queue that could take months to clear out” 
(#15).  
One of the key challenges emerging from the evolution 
of computer storage is that the triage process has 
changed substantially over the past years. As 
mentioned by #16, some years ago they would 
“confiscate a desktop disk, possibly a laptop … 
nowadays, police officers come back from a suspect’s 
house with desktop hard drives, laptops, several SD 
memory cards, plenty of USB sticks, external hard 
drives, mobile phones, etc.” For one case alone, the 
police had confiscated a total of “17 devices”; this is 
something that “complicates both the triage process 
and the full forensic examination and makes it more 
time consuming” (#16). Referring to a single case 
within the CCU, “it was impossible to look at the 1.5 
million images we found across his devices; if we were 
to do that, we would increase the risk of (mis)handling 
other cases” (#15). The balance that needs to be struck 
in managing cases/volume is challenging because of 
the technological variety and new demands posed by 
new developments (e.g., cloud storage, the TOR 
browser that gives access to the dark web).  
Despite the variety of technological artifacts used in 
tackling online CSE, the triage process is relying only 
on the INITIATE software. This is a shared 
collaborative tool amongst a small team of officers. 
Once the devices are docked and the content is 
mirrored for the examination, data extraction begins. 
This “includes deleted photographs/videos and 
communications data while the whole process is 
documented based on national guidelines” (#15). 
Then, by using the INITIATE software, users will 
scroll through the extracted material in the user-
interface of the software and manually categorize any 
material on a scale of 1 to 10 based on severity. They 
will then create a report for the digital forensics 
department for a full examination. The underlying 
basis of how the software scans for extracted material 
and designates file types can be customized and “users 
do tend to create their own profiles where a lot of filters 
that can be (de)selected … even though there is always 
 
5 Known as a full IPOC search (i.e., indecent pictures of 
children).  
the option of asking the software to find as much as 
possible in one go or use one of the eight different 
built-in default search profiles” (#15). For example, a 
detailed search profile5 collects allocated, embedded, 
deleted pictures and videos, searches for common 
keywords related to online CSE, searches for known 
hash values, collects received files from various 
applications (e.g., Skype) and other media cache 
folders, office documents, and registry files, searches 
for antiforensic applications, collects user desktop 
shortcuts, and so forth. Processing times vary 
depending on the filtering mechanism used but one 
indication given was that 500GB would take a full day 
for processing. On some occasions, a scan could be 
running for two weeks and produce terabytes as a 
report. Because a considerable amount of time is 
required to scan the devices confiscated, “users will 
often stop the scan if they think they’ve seen enough” 
to secure prosecution, though “90% of the time we let 
scans run to the end (#16).” Of course, the danger for 
the remaining 10% of the time is that the analysis 
might miss first-generation images. An example of 
such a near miss was when the image corroborating the 
attempted rape of a two-year-old boy by his father was 
extracted at the very end of a scan.  
Adjustments on the sensitivity of the profiles for 
filtering represents an additional concern. The 
INITIATE software allows for several different 
options, including ranges, pattern modifiers, 
quantifiers, and sample prefixed patterns by the 
software company. The very act of the necessary ad 
hoc selection by triage users at the CCU invokes the 
risk that the technological profiling mechanisms 
through which content is analyzed and suspects are 
identified are not appropriate. In other words, what 
gets flagged and evaluated is contingent on whether the 
related filter(s) that will yield the result is selected or 
deselected. Reflecting on the technological 
contingencies, software use, profiling methods used, 
and the nature of the phenomenon, the following six 
key concerns emerged from the analysis of our 
interviews (mostly #15 and #16). First, the really 
technically skilled offenders may be escaping 
detection, because any custom filters that would detect 
their behavior might not be applied. Second, the 
capacity for staff members that can actually conduct 
such triage scans and use the INITIATE software is 
limited and needs to be increased, but lack of practice 
and training were identified as inhibitors. Third, the 
backlog of confiscated devices to be triaged has 
(periodically) increased to nine months. This is often 
quickly ameliorated by outsourcing some of the 
workload, though the financial sustainability of 
outsourcing such work is problematic. Fourth, cloud-
based storage and related applications complicate the 
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process time-wise, as a preservation order is required 
for limiting the suspect’s access to the cloud before the 
data can be mirrored and analyzed. Fifth, users who 
work with such imagery undergo an annual mental 
health evaluation, meaning that all users of INITIATE 
would fall into that category. However, based on #14, 
it would be much more interesting and effective if user-
stress evaluations were built into the use of such triage 
software on an ongoing basis. This could identify users 
under stress based on behavioral patterns of software 
interaction. Sixth, while INITIATE triages data 
captured from confiscated devices, there is no capacity 
to examine anything related to the dark web and such 
investigations are within the remit of national-level 
agencies (e.g., in the intelligence community).  
6.2.4 Law Enforcement IS 4: Risk 
Assessment and Prioritization 
In parallel to the use of all the above systems, another 
tool is used, which we anonymize as TARGET. This 
software is being used as a standalone tool in order to 
evaluate the potential risk that an offender might be a 
contact sex offender by conducting behavioral 
psychological profiling. As #13 mentioned: “the 
filtering mechanism is conducted by applying a 
classification tool that helps us prioritize our 
workload.” Although we received a copy of the 
TARGET manual from the police, we were asked not 
to disclose how this tool works in detail, because the 
material is classified as “Official Sensitive.” Thus, we 
restrict our description to broad functions. Through a 
series of questions that the user (i.e., the police analyst 
at the CCU) is asked by the TARGET system, a 
high/medium/low risk is assigned to each offender. 
This is specific to whether the offender could be a 
contact offender. For example, individuals who have 
“easy access to children,” for instance by working in a 
school, receive a relatively high risk-score for “access” 
from a preselected list. Clearly, high risk-scores 
receive overall priority. However, building the 
intelligence profile for a suspect is time consuming and 
takes about one week (or two to three days if there are 
additional concerns that would elevate the 
prioritization). According to both #13, #14, managing 
this “ongoing risk” by using technology in various 
forms (e.g., different software) is the single biggest 
challenge, particularly since the victim could be 
anywhere in the world and cross-border 
communication would transcend several different 
systems and scattered intelligence about offenders. 
Perhaps a surprising element in the context of using the 
TARGET system is its complete disconnect from the 
assessment of imagery. In terms of the future 
development of information systems in tackling online 
CSE, refining the risk-scoring for potential contact sex 
offenses and providing simultaneous risk indicators 
through imagery for profiling and prioritizing suspects 
is highly desirable. At the moment, the TARGET 
system “doesn’t care if the suspect has downloaded 
one illegal image or 100,000 images—it’s based on 
psychological profiling alone” (#15). This provides 
counterintuitive results, as someone who has 
downloaded a single image may be marked as high 
risk. Again, the issue of interoperability/intelligence-
sharing between different IS emerges. 
6.2.5 Law Enforcement IS 5: Digital 
Forensics 
The “last stop” of the process is the forensics 
department of the CCU. The CCU manager echoed the 
concerns above while adding additional issues. 
“Resourcing against increasing demand” remains a 
substantial challenge. As #16 mentioned, “a member 
of [the] staff would undergo 12-18 months of specialist 
training to use the (information) systems we have here 
... and then, of course, there is a more general technical 
knowledge issue and training of police officers in the 
field. For example, they may file a report on a 
confiscated mobile phone, and the report asks them to 
fill out what an IMEI is and they wouldn’t know that.” 
A “basic level of being comfortable with IT” is 
considered to be essential. Police officers, through no 
fault of their own, present a risk in terms of what 
intelligence is fed into different systems (e.g., 
incomplete or mistaken data entries).  
Within the forensics team, several computer-based 
systems are used; this variety contributes to the 
training time required. Limited staff resources mean 
that “people are doing things they shouldn’t be doing” 
(#16). For instance, mobile phone extraction software 
users are overburdened; thus, their cases are allocated 
to other officers who are less familiar with the 
software. Also, while a few primary forensic software 
tools are used to examine confiscated devices and the 
same image categorization tools that follow up from 
the triage process in order to classify images based on 
sentencing guidelines (A: extreme imagery, B: 
medium, C: least extreme), the biggest demand for 
hardware/software is for mobile phones. In that 
context, the forensics team uses “two specialist 
applications but there’s an increasing need for mobile 
docking stations dedicated to mobile phone analysis” 
(#16). The kiosks that analyze mobile phones are in 
high demand, and, even though the forensics team 
examines all seized exhibits, determining the priorities 
for each case is not always straightforward. Based on 
an estimate given to us, 42% of the examined mobile 
phones led to drug-related intelligence and “removing 
a lot of that volume out of the office” is not always 
easy. There is an increasing need for faster 
hardware/software configurations that will triage 
mobile phones to identify low-level crime and redirect 
it, thus allowing the team to focus on online CSE.  
Perhaps one of the best examples of a specialist 
information system posing demands for both officers 
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in the field and for the forensics team is the REVERSE 
system (our anonymization). According to #16, in 
addressing online CSE, although encryption 
safeguards legitimate transacting, “encryption is an 
obstacle.” When pin-locked devices are brought to the 
forensics team and devices are password protected, the 
team tries to get around the security measures by 
hacking into the devices so that the content can be 
evaluated. The REVERSE software aims to address 
this gap: it also takes physical evidence that is collected 
by police officers in the field, including, among other 
evidence types, letters, bills, and anything else that 
police officers might consider important. It then 
combines them with other pieces of information 
collected electronically and generates a list of 
passwords from such bits of intelligence to gain access 
to the device(s). If this stage fails and access to the 
devices is not secured by the forensics team, the CCU 
resorts to a legal process6 that demands that suspects 
supply their passwords. Failure to do so renders them 
liable for prosecution, but this process is a “costly legal 
resort. If decryption fails, [prosecution] cannot be 
instigated without national approval and realistically 
very few people get convicted” (#16). Thus, from the 
point of view of the forensics team, encryption is a 
significant constraint. 
The specialist use of such IS has recently led the UK 
government to reclassify all digital forensic departments 
as laboratories, prompting all to seek international 
accreditation.7 This strengthens the legal admissibility 
and evidential weight of electronically harvested, 
analyzed, and categorized digital information. It also 
safeguards the processes used throughout online CSE 
investigations and further minimizes any risks of third 
parties “planting incriminating information like in the 
case of a male suspect who was innocent and his ex-wife 
had planted child pornographic imagery on his computer 
to gain custody of their children” (#13). Working toward 
accreditation is creating “several new organizational 
demands that will require a persistent effort … the 
simplest one being the recruitment of specialist 
personnel to guide us through this process and a quality 
manager,” as well as “changing the processes to fit the 
standard” (#16). However, the subtle issue of how 
different information systems construct the 
prioritization and identification of suspects remains. Put 
differently, technology use in online CSE constructs the 
pathways through which suspicion is identified in 
complex ways. We would prompt other IS scholars to 
explore the variable technological construction of online 
CSE at the level of suspicion. How algorithms and the 
use of technology prioritize and allow certain suspects 
to emerge, while others are either deprioritized or 
dismissed, is of pivotal interest. The development of 
algorithmic accountability in such contexts remains 
critical. Ultimately, reducing the complexity of online 
CSE through IS use is reflected across all stages. When 
it comes to dealing with the prosecution of online CSE, 
“a lot of forensic labs have set their criteria to 250 Class 
A imagery while over 50 Class A designations would 
stand up in court” (#16). However, the use of different 
IS and filtering restrictions creates a forceful reduction 
of complexity and creates additional risks. Based on 
#15, in one such example, “the totality of devices 
indexed had 1.4 million images to search through but the 
software got only 0.01% because of filtering restrictions 
… on occasion, we’re running a big risk for unknowns.” 
The alternative of a manual analysis is unrealistic given 
the volume to be examined. While diagrams simplify 
and reduce the content, the framework in Figure 2 
summarizes some of the core aspects discussed above 
and brings together the preliminary TIDM model with 
the organizational context.  
Figure 2 connects the main staging (Stages 1-4) of the 
TIDM with the organizational context in the CCU and 
the different IS used to tackle the phenomenon. First, on 
the right-hand side of the diagram, we notice that Stages 
1-3 demand the participation of both victims (children 
and parents) and offenders. However, Stage 4 is 
somewhat distinct in that it occurs through P2P 
networks, elite pedophile communities, and dark web 
markets. Thus, as an activity, Stage 4 can occur 
independently but is also fueled by the continuous 
stream of activities that offenders initiate in order to lure 
more victims. Whereas we have seen the connections 
involved with attempting to monitor trafficking through 
INFOTRACK, the constraint remains that this is not a 
permanently-on connection. Real-time monitoring and 
increasing ISP collaboration in this context are very 
important but touch upon the sensitive debate of privacy 
versus security (Etzioni, 2015). Spotting first-generation 
imagery quickly so that high-risk abuse and “live cases” 
can be investigated remains very challenging because of 
the volume of data, lack of resources, and diffusion of 
intelligence. The variety of IS being used, often for 
complementary tasks, leads to fragmentation as 
hardware demands increase (e.g., mobile docking 
stations, decryption).  
Furthermore, in the context of Stages 1-3, the CCU 
relies on technology companies to report suspicious 
activity. Based on #3 and #6, a common concern is that 
social networking and other technology companies are 
not doing enough to suppress the phenomenon. With 
information systems like HARVEST failing to capture 
real suspected offenders and the only other viable option 
for luring offenders is online impersonation of children 
by cybercrime officers, we need to rethink the 
relationship between technology companies and 
cybercrime police in the context of online CSE. 
 
6 In the UK, this would be invoking Process Section 49 of the 
RIPA code (Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.) 
7 ISO 17025 




Figure 2. IS in Online CSE 
 
Some (#3, #14) argue that select cybercrime police 
officers should have direct unlimited access to social 
media platforms but this is likely to meet resistance. 
Similarly, hardware black-box ISP filtering is one 
countermeasure that could be explored for Stage 4, but 
this raises similar concerns regarding the propagation of 
a surveillance state, exploitation of access for other 
reasons, and privacy violations. A combined exploration 
of this field alongside privacy-enhancing technologies 
(PETs) could lead to significant privacy-friendly 
monitoring innovations (Heurix et al., 2015). 
While the challenges presented across Stages 1-4 are 
escalating, the organizational barriers at the CCU raise 
further difficulties in preventing and detecting online 
CSE. Separate command areas between critical teams 
should work more closely together. Also, intelligence 
can be found across several stakeholders that are often 
outside the CCU that is handling the ongoing 
cyberrisk. While the core utilities of IS can be 
recognized as serving (1) the timely identification of 
first-generation imagery, and (2) the identification and 
risk-scoring of offenders who have a higher probability 
of being contact sex offenders, these two elements are 
not really linked. Furthermore, training staff for online 
CSE is complex and requires serious investment. 
Specialist knowledge (e.g., at the forensic level) is 
demanding but there is also an increasing need to 
educate field officers. 
Overall, the technology-based prioritization of online 
CSE cases is complex. The role that technology 
companies play, as well as that of ISPs and many other 
stakeholders that may be involved in deploying online 
CSE countermeasures through specialist information 
systems, is still emerging. As such, it is worthy of 
exploration from IS scholars. Most of the emphasis on 
countermeasures appears to be on how Stage 4 
(trafficking) is handled through INFOTRACK, while 
the application of filtering across different levels raises 
an additional issue: how the related IS are used and 
integrated and end up “determining” who is 
recommended for prosecution and who is considered 
to be a suspect. This “determination” is far from causal, 
given the variety of filtering options being used. 
Different approaches for managing online CSE 
investigations run the risk of missing victims or 
flagging suspects in an inconsistent manner. Sadly, the 
online behavior of both parents and children 
contributes unwittingly to the volume of child imagery, 
as posted images are harvested and distorted by 
offenders and become comingled with first-generation 
imagery. The multidimensionality of technological 
interferences and the challenges faced in online CSE 
makes it critical to explore, model, and reflect upon the 
dynamic between technology and online CSE. We 
present the affordances of technology in online CSE in 
Table F1 in the Appendix. We need to remember here 
that artifacts can have both enabling and constraining 
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expressions that are relational for different user groups. 
Our emphasis remains on the relationality between 
enabling affordances for offenders (so that we can 
understand how their use of technology allows them to 
fulfill their goal to lure children) and the enabling 
affordances for the CCU (allowing cybercrime police 
to address the phenomenon). Each user group should 
have constraints: IS research should be conducted with 
a view toward increasing the constraints for offenders 
and decreasing the constraints for cybercrime police. 
Our combined research into the stages of the 
phenomenon and the organizational context allows us 
to depict (1) how the escalation of the phenomenon 
occurs (from the perspective of offenders and how they 
use certain artifacts, features, images to achieve their 
goals), and (2) how the de-escalation of the 
phenomenon is attempted by cybercrime police. We 
accept the (unavoidable) limitation that there is a much 
greater number of affordances that can be captured; 
more research needs to occur within IS so that we can 
understand this phenomenon better. For example, 
technology companies like Facebook could be 
deploying their own technology artifacts, features of 
which would enable them to de-escalate the 
phenomenon but, without access to Facebook as a 
research setting, we cannot include these. Where an 
affordance can be considered as a shared, collective, or 
misperceived affordance, based on our discussion on 
affordances in the following section, we indicate that 
in Table F1. 
7 Discussion on Affordances 
While technological affordances have both enabling 
and constraining expressions, as shown in Table F1, 
the multidimensionality and interconnectedness of 
affordances point to a problem that is truly difficult to 
untangle. This article makes a first attempt toward 
deconstructing the role of technology and imagery in 
online CSE from an IS perspective. It is important to 
assert that IS research can make a difference in two 
ways: (1) by focusing on studies around the de-
actualization of the enabling affordances for offenders 
and, of course, by increasing, strengthening, and 
inventing new constraining affordances for offenders 
(so that their goal of luring children through 
technology use is disrupted); and (2) by strengthening 
the enabling affordances for cybercrime teams and 
minimizing their constraining affordances—here, the 
study of different cybercrime teams and jurisdictions 
could shed some valuable light. The study of the 
broader organizational IS context within which 
cybercrime teams are embedded is also significant, as 
we have shown in our analysis. The same applies to the 
critical role of technology providers and, in particular, 
social networking companies; a deeper exploration of 
their organizational dimensions and a clearer 
understanding of the problems, challenges, and missed 
opportunities that they face in addressing the 
phenomenon would lead to additional lines of 
scholarly inquiry. A longitudinal in-depth case study of 
a major social networking company would be 
invaluable in this context. Overall, our organization of 
affordances in Table F1 can assist IS scholars in 
concentrating their lines of exploration further.  
Through our empirical findings, we delineate several 
ways through which technology is used by offenders to 
fulfill their goal-oriented actions. By using social 
networking sites, web applications, image editing 
software, face-swap applications, AI-based deepfakes, 
P2P networks, the dark web, cloud storage, as well as 
elite forums that are supported by underground digital 
economies and cryptocurrencies (or custom-made 
digital tokens), offenders are quick to adopt new 
technologies to enable their illegal goals of luring 
children online. The technology artifacts involved, the 
corresponding user characteristics of offenders, the 
enabling/constraining affordances, and the 
corresponding outcomes are listed in Table 2, while the 
centrality of imagery across many affordances is 
evident. By bringing together the insights of our 
preliminary model (depicting only the offenders’ side), 
the organizational insights from studying the CCU, and 
the extracted affordances in Table F1, we 
reconceptualize and describe our comprehensive 
model (Figure 3), which depicts both the offenders’ 
side and the CCU’s side.  
The nested triangles A, B, and C in Figure 3 both 
summarize and generalize what we have learned about 
online CSE. The left side of the triangle illustrates how 
properties of technology shape how users interact with 
them. The right side shows how properties of imagery 
invite users to act in various ways. Below, we describe 
the nested triangles briefly before discussing the 
affordances. 
A. Stages of online CSE: The center triangle of Figure 
3 shows the various stages of online CSE: (1) initiation 
of contact, (2) trust development, (3) online extortion, 
and (4) trafficking.  
B. Escalation of online CSE: The second triangle of 
Figure 3 represents how offenders make use of the 
enabling affordances of technology and imagery; the 
goal-oriented action of offenders results in the 
escalation of online CSE. Of course, for each stage, 
offenders are limited by the constraining affordances 
of the corresponding artifacts (see Table F1). But, 
overall, it is the enabling affordances here that 
contribute to the escalation of the phenomenon, as 
captured by D1 and D2 of the diagram corresponding 
to all four stages of online CSE. 




Figure 3. The Technology and Imagery Dimensions Model (TIDM) 
C. De-escalation of online CSE: The outermost 
triangle represents the complicated actions of how 
cybercrime police (or in some cases, vigilantes), make 
use of the affordances of technology and imagery so 
that they can de-escalate online CSE. Like the 
perpetrators, these parties are limited by the 
constraining affordances of artifacts.  
A number of IS streams can be associated with de-
actualizing the enabling affordances of artifacts for 
offenders and dampening their effects. Image analytics 
(Vuppala et al., 2018), trust and digital identity 
(Halperin & Backhouse, 2012), deconstructing the 
dark side of social media (Baccarella et al., 2018), the 
study of online underground markets, and cybermoney 
laundering (Philippsohn, 2001; Demetis, 2018) are all 
important but they need to be concentrated onto the 
disruption of online CSE. A more targeted focus on the 
handling of digital forensics (Garfinkel, 2010) in the 
context of online CSE is also necessary. 
Organizational IS have much to contribute in this 
space, as we observed and discussed several 
organizational/IS barriers that create limitations in the 
sharing of intelligence and in the prioritization of 
cases. Interoperability concerns, risk-based 
approaches, and communication disconnects within 
the police are all worthy of further exploration.  
Our empirical data also point to misperceived 
affordances. While these affordances are not perceived 
by the user groups, they do exist (Gaver, 1991). For 
example, the misperceived affordance (A9 in Table 
F1) captures the possibility of unintentional image 
(over)sharing by parents, children, and other 
stakeholders (e.g., schools), which can lead to 
exploitation. Such imagery is captured, distorted, 
sexualized, and recirculated as online pornography; the 
desensitization of children toward online privacy and 
the comingling of imagery creates further detection 
challenges. The field of IS offers a number of streams 
in this context. A focus on privacy and data sharing 
already exists (Furnell, 2015), as do focuses on 
behavioral IS security (Dhillon, Syed, & Pedron, 
2016), user-controlled privacy in relation to mobile 
phones and privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) 
(ENISA, 2015), and cyberawareness (Franke & 
Brynielsson, 2014). But, thus far, these streams have 
not focused on online CSE. A focus on online CSE 
would create invaluable contributions that could lead 
to the de-escalation of this phenomenon. Design 
implications will demand further exploration of these 
goals.  
While systemic difficulties in handling these aspects 
create severe challenges for the future, still, even in the 
face of such adversity, a number of distinct ways can 
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be identified in which technology enables the de-
escalation of the phenomenon, despite several 
constraints (e.g., handling encryption, resourcing 
problems, interoperability concerns, etc). For example, 
the identification of previously circulated (second-
generation) imagery through the INFOTRACK system 
and the CAID database enables the prioritization of 
first-generation imagery and the recognition of 
potentially live cases at a much faster pace (A5 in 
Table 2). More IS research in this context in peer-to-
peer network monitoring and filtering (Weber, 2016), 
darknet monitoring (Nunes et al., 2016) and digital 
forensics may yield considerable insights through 
which this could be reinforced.  
Similarly, the use of behavioral profiling and other 
filtering approaches to risk-score the severity of 
offenders (A7) and the vulnerability of children would 
assist cybercrime authorities seeking to end the 
ongoing exploitation of victims. Profiling (Lamb & 
Kling, 2003; Middleton, Shadbolt, & De Roure, 2004) 
and the closely related practices of risk prioritization 
and management (Spears & Barki, 2017), as well as the 
development of software capable of enabling such 
prioritization, all need to be considered. A subtler point 
arises here regarding the algorithms that determine 
such prioritizations since the associated criminal 
investigations are often triggered by who is flagged as 
more highly suspect. Particularly when algorithmic 
transparency is very difficult if not impossible to 
achieve (e.g., because of “black box” approaches like 
machine learning), one can speak of the technological 
construction of suspicion. Thus, algorithmic 
accountability in this context acquires a particular 
significance (Garfinkel et al., 2017).  
Another significant potential for de-escalation arises 
from efforts to gain access to offender devices and 
accounts (both cloud-based and confiscated devices) 
(A11). The work of cybercrime authorities can make a 
substantial difference in safeguarding children; cloud-
based and digital forensics, as well as data filtering for 
prioritization, are two indicative IS streams that can 
strengthen the enabling affordances for the police. 
Unfortunately, encryption also enables offenders to 
protect their digital assets and thus remains a 
battleground between encryption-focused offenders 
and decryption-focused digital forensic specialists. 
The context of balancing the strengthening of 
encryption and its exploitation by offenders with the 
decryption capacities of cybercrime units remains truly 
challenging.  
Even though we observed several IS at the CCU that 
could contribute to the de-escalation of the 
phenomenon and the pursuit of offenders, we would 
 
8  Formally, the Crown Prosecution Service discourages 
online vigilantes for online CSE, as they might endanger 
themselves, interfere with formal police investigations, and 
like to highlight the ability of cybercrime agents and 
online vigilantes 8  to conduct impersonations of 
children themselves in order to expose offenders. 
While the process of having police officers lure 
offenders by impersonating children online can be time 
consuming, the use of social networks that enable the 
exposure of offenders is also shared with online 
vigilantes and their users. As we saw in our description 
in the previous section, an automated replication of this 
process was attempted by the HARVEST IS, which 
monitored online conversations for offender 
identification (A10 in Table 2) by listening to social 
media conversations in real time. While this was shut 
down because of the sheer number of false positives, a 
variety of other computational approaches could be 
explored toward that end. In the future, advanced 
“honeypot techniques” with digital tokens (Shabtai et 
al., 2016), machine learning (Pearl, 2019), or AI-based 
chatbots (Androutsopoulou et al., 2019) may take over 
the role of undercover cybercrime agents posing as 
children online. Overall, we do perceive the role of AI 
as having a set of potentially critical effects for both 
escalating and de-escalating the phenomenon. We 
prompt other IS scholars to explore these potential 
effects in detail; for example, deepfakes and AI-based 
face/voice mimicking would allow offenders to attract 
more victims and make artificial identities more 
convincing and realistic, while better detection tools 
could expose such deepfakes and alert users (an AI vs. 
AI scenario). Similarly, AI developments might assist 
police if autonomous software-based cybercrime 
agents could be launched online, attempting to 
converse with/expose offenders autonomously before 
referring them for a manual cybercrime review.  
8 Future Research Directions, 
Limitations, and Conclusion 
This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of 
online CSE by using a grounded theory approach and 
developing a model (TIDM) to depict the staging of 
online CSE in relation to imagery and technology 
contextualized within an organizational context and 
also by organizing technology affordances around 
online CSE. The complexity of the phenomenon, the 
multiplicity of IS-related considerations, and the 
enormous social impact associated with online CSE 
must prompt other IS scholars to engage with it.  
While an obvious path for further research would be a 
deeper exploration of the affordances presented in 
Table F1, there are a number of additional questions 
we would like to raise. What online behavioral patterns 
can alert us to a higher probability that a youngster may 
break the law if they participate in a crime and receive 
imagery.  
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be targeted (based on their online behavior)? Can (and 
should) technology companies use vulnerable social 
interaction filtering to flag potential vulnerabilities in 
how children use technology (similar to the way in 
which banks use suspicious transaction filtering 
software to flag potential suspects for illegal behavior 
such as money laundering, fraud, etc.)? If so, what 
would be the indicators/proxies of online behavioral 
vulnerability for children over time? What are the 
privacy considerations associated with such 
monitoring?  
The above considerations raise several additional 
research questions that are ripe for research: How do 
dark web affordances enable and constrain the 
activities of offenders and the CCU? A dark-web based 
study could yield significant insights. What is the role 
of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin in facilitating 
transactions for underground markets? How do online 
predators seek collaboration through online 
ecosystems/networks, and how could P2P monitoring 
be strengthened for real-time filtering of suspicious 
online CSE behavior?  
Also, as internet users, children routinely violate terms 
and conditions regarding age limits. Could this 
violation be inferred by the semantic analysis of the 
texts/posts being sent by children as a preventative 
measure? What monitoring mechanisms could social 
networking companies develop for such behavior? In-
depth case studies of social media and other 
technology companies that attempt to address this 
phenomenon would help elevate our understanding of 
the challenges of tackling online CSE under the 
difficult data deluge conditions we describe. 
Furthermore, while IS research has focused on online 
trust in various contexts, the dark side of online trust 
and what this means for phenomena like online CSE 
raise important questions: What are the qualitative 
differences between offenders that attempt to establish 
deception-oriented online trust and stakeholders in 
other contexts that seek to establish true online trust? 
Would a comparison between online CSE and online 
SE (of adults) expose further interesting 
differentiations that could yield better results?  
Finally, the overall handling of online CSE and the 
way the phenomenon itself has emerged and evolved 
raises several ethical considerations. In this spirit, there 
is a rich literature at the intersection of ethics and IS 
that could be applied in order to unpack the ethical 
dimensions of the phenomenon. Classical theories in 
ethics and more contemporary information ethics 
(Floridi, 2008) could probe further important questions 
regarding values in technology, personal values in 
computer ethics, rights of algorithms in 
monitoring/filtering sensitive phenomena like online 
CSE, and the ethics of IT-artifacts themselves. An 
ethical deconstruction of the phenomenon would also 
help us probe the conditions under which more 
invasive profiling/monitoring of online CSE could be 
conducted in order to safeguard children.  
Online CSE is a serious and complex phenomenon 
with multiple IS-dimensionalities. We hope that our 
study motivates scholars in our discipline as well as in 
other disciplines to explore this phenomenon further. 
We hope that our article encourages all readers 
(researchers, members of law enforcement, policy 
makers, systems developers, and parents) to take every 
possible opportunity to participate in the fight against 
online CSE. 
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Table A1. Problematization for the Phenomenon of Online CSE 
Typology of Assumptions Open for Problematization 
In-house Root metaphor Paradigm based Ideology Field 
Key assumptions include (1) 
its escalation due to 
underground markets, (2) 
offender approaches to 
coercion, (3) children 
targeting and availability of 
online information, (4) the 
key role between parents 
and children, and (5) online 
behavior. 
By deceiving and luring children online 
through a variety of platforms and social 
networks, offenders can victimize children 
online and gain access to child pornographic 
imagery (for their own use or for P2P 
exchanges).  
The development of different 
classifications for internet offenders 
(e.g., travelers/traders) seems to play a 
key role in different research approaches 
around the phenomenon. How we know 
what we know about the phenomenon 
seems to be intertwined around 
classifications and offender attitudes as 
well as offender/victim interaction but 
an IS perspective is missing. 
Without a doubt, tackling 
online CSE is a morally 
charged phenomenon but 
some aspects (e.g., role of 
parenting in child 
protection in relation to 
their internet behavior) are 
not understood in their 
broader context. Gender-
related assumptions sees 
men in the role of 
perpetrators; while this is 
largely accurate, it can 
create blind spots or 
advanced deception tactics.  
General assumptions shared 
involve (1) the critical role 
of imagery, (2) escalation of 
the phenomenon, (3) its 
security prominence, and (4) 
organizational challenges in 
handling it. 
Principles for Identifying and Challenging Assumptions 
1. Identified domains of 
literature significant for 
online CSE  
2. Identified 





4. Consider alternative assumptions 5. Relate assumptions to 
audience 
6. Evaluate alternative 
assumptions 
While criminology (mostly) 
and law have dealt 
extensively with online 
CSE, IS research has not 
engaged with the 
phenomenon. Most work 
seems to concentrate on 
classification and 
developing typologies.  
Key role of imagery 
but also online CSE 




pursuit have many 
challenges.  
Indeed, the role of 
imagery remains 
central to online 
CSE; however, it 
does not seem to be 
rendered into the 
combined challenges 
of escalation/de-
escalation, or indeed, 
into the 
organizational 
challenges of the 
cybercrime teams.  
The role of imagery plays a more 
foundational role in fueling/defusing the 
phenomenon, but the scope of the 
enabling/constraining expressions of 
imagery are not well understood nor 
linked to an organizational context. We 
challenge the role of imagery by seeing 
it as a broader dimension of interference 
for online CSE (occupying different 
contexts, institutional efforts, 
organizational processes, and shaping 
enabling/constraining or misperceived 
affordances). The same applies to 
different technology artifacts or 
platforms and the way they interfere 
with the phenomenon. 
From politicians, to 
technology companies, to 
cybercrime teams (or even 
other specialized teams), 
stakeholder assumptions 
about the phenomenon 
(e.g., on imagery) tend to be 
confined in the space of 
their own utility but 
technology cuts across this 
phenomenon and propels 
sociotechnical challenges 
that are not well 
understood. 
A theoretical combination 
staging the phenomenon 
with an understanding of (1) 
how the phenomenon 
escalates, and (2) how 
cybercrime units attempt to 
de-escalate it and what the 
organizational challenges 
around it are would be very 
useful for developing a 
deeper understanding of 
online CSE from an IS 
perspective. 
Note: Adapted from Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011 
  




Department of Justice 
U.S. Attorney’s Office 
Middle District of Florida 
 
Jacksonville Man Pleads Guilty to Soliciting and Paying for Live Molestation of Children over the Internet—Jacksonville, Florida—United States Attorney A. Lee 
Bentley, III announces that Justin Laurence McKinley (49, Jacksonville) has pleaded guilty to sending notices over the Internet soliciting the live molestation of children 
for online viewing. He faces a mandatory minimum penalty of 15 years, up to 30 years, in federal prison and a potential life term of supervision.  
According to court documents, in 2015, the FBI began an investigation into a website engaging in the exploitation and enticement of children to participate in sexual 
activity. The FBI identified several individuals located in the United States that were associated with this website. Further investigation revealed that several individuals 
in a foreign country were engaged in the molestation of young children for the purpose of broadcasting live streaming “sex shows” to online viewers who had paid a fee. 
The individuals were arrested and McKinley was identified as one of the individuals who paid to view these live streaming “sex shows.” Between January 2014 and 
December 2015, McKinley sent a total of 100 electronic fund transfers, totalling $31,415, to the individuals who molested the children in the “sex shows.” 
On May 27, 2016, law enforcement officers executed a federal search warrant at McKinley’s residence. During an interview, McKinley admitted that he had solicited 
others to molest children and live stream video of the conduct to him, and he further admitted that he had recorded many of the sessions. The victims depicted in the 
streaming videos ranged in age from a new-born to an 8-year-old child. Forensic analyses of McKinley’s computer media revealed that a particular external hard drive 
contained at least 613 videos and 6,846 images depicting the sexual abuse of children. This case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Jacksonville 
Sheriff’s Office, and law enforcement authorities in several other countries. It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney D. Rodney Brown. It is another case 
brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual 
exploitation and abuse. Led by United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals 
federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who sexually exploit children, and to identify and rescue victims. For more information 
about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.justice.gov/psc. 
  




Table C1. Sample records from Phase 1  
 















Figure D1. Time Slices During Phase 1 







Figure E1: Grounded Theory Approach (adapted by Charmaz, 2014) 

















IS streams that could 
contribute to de-
escalation 
A1: Contact initiation and 
communication through 
proxy identities  
 




(between offenders and 






Offenders have the ability to 
connect with children by 
masking their real identity. 
Find children online 
and communicate with 
them 
Only known sex 
offenders or those 
imprisoned are 
constrained in 
initiating contact  
Communication with 
children is 
established easily as 
the real identity of 





(1) Police officers mask their 
identities online using similar 
tactics and “reverse engineer” 
the online behavior of 
offenders. This constraint 
applies also to: 
 
(2) Online vigilantes 














Ability to lure 
offenders into 
activities that expose 
their behavior and 
identify them for 
arrests, confiscation 
of devices, digital 
forensics, and 
pursuing prosecution 
AI, machine learning, 





A2: Trust development 
through digital imagery  
 






Offenders have the ability to 
use nude imagery in social 
networks and other 
applications in order to gain 
the (initial) trust of the 
victims and waiting for it to 
be elevated (often by offering 
nude imagery first) 
Generate photorealistic 
imagery, communicate 
such imagery through 
social networks, use 
real child pornography 
to attract further victims 
Real-time nude 
imagery detection in 
some applications 
can be triggered to 
constrain offender 






become compliant to 
demands while 
deceived by the use 
of fake imagery 
supporting the 
digital identity of the 
offender 
Hardware/software based 
image detection and 
blocking, trust and 
digital identity, identity 
management systems, IS 
management of large-
scale image analytics  
A3: Engage in online 
extortion and receive 
first-generation imagery 
 






Offenders communicate with 
victims and once the latter 
have offered imagery, 
offenders threaten them and 
place them in a suspended 
state of extortion 
Receive and store child 
pornography online, 
establish/maintain the 
continuous supply of 
imagery by using 
extortion tactics, and 
store such imagery 
Real-time nude 
imagery detection in 
some applications 
can be triggered to 
constrain offender 
goal in receiving 
imagery 
Children feel forced 
to offer nude 
imagery under 
extreme pressure and 
threats (e.g., death 
threats to family 
members) while the 
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A4: Traffic child 
imagery, encrypt imagery 
and explore elite 
networking or 
monetization/gamification 
[ITDM – Stage 4] 
Shared affordance (for 
trafficking)  
Collective affordance (for 
elite networking with 
differential use) 
P2P networks, 





Offenders communicate with 
other offenders to exchange 
imagery. They can also 
encrypt imagery and explore 
other exchange-oriented 
forms (e.g., elite networks 
and gamified/monetized 
online CSE) 







































generation imagery and 






National Crime Agency users 
and CCU users rely on this IS 
to identify second-generation 
imagery 
 
Police officers in the field 
have additional demands so 
that PhotoDNA and 
associated tools can be used 
(e.g., photograph empty 
rooms of suspects to link 
historical online CSE cases) 
 
Monitor P2P networks 
for files being 
exchanged and separate 
second-generation 






that is not high risk or 
time sensitive.  
 
Link offender to 
multiple victims in 
historical cases 
Not a permanently 
on connection and 
restricted by the 
overwhelming data 
deluge created in 
online networks.  
 





















of image recognition, 
network monitoring, P2P 
monitoring and analysis  
 
 
A6: Combine intelligence 
from different sources and 
build up offender profiles 
 
Collective affordance 
(differential use based on 
user experience) 






Cybercrime police officers;  
awareness of distributed 
intelligence and/or missing 
intelligence 
Build offender profiles 
from multiple sources 
in order to prioritize 
cases 
Data quality issues, 
perception of poor 
ability to combine 
intelligence in a 






make it very difficult 
in some cases to 
build comprehensive 
offender profiles.  
Interoperability at 
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A7: Conduct time-
sensitive scan on imagery 




(CCU users conduct this 





TARGET (risk),  
CCU users operating the 
INITIATE (IS) for triage 
purposes prioritize high-risk 
cases (also with the help of 
TARGET) and forward those 
for full forensic analysis 
Collect enough imagery 
to secure prosecution  
 
(e.g., under UK law, 50 
class A photographs) 
Missed first- 
generation imagery 
due to filtering 
restrictions and 
volume demands; 




Children that are 
victims might be 
missed due to 
algorithmic/profiling 
restrictions, while 
the volume of data 
makes triage 
necessary and might 
create backlogs 
Risk-based approaches 







A8: Prioritize vulnerable 




IT analysts in school IT 
departments ability to 
conduct monitoring of the 
online searches of children 
via school IT infrastructure 
Prioritize children that 
are more vulnerable for 
online CSE at school 
Inability to process 
all red flags due to 
their sheer volume  
The way children 
use technology at 
school can provide 
early-warning 
vectors of future 
victimization but 
these monitoring 
tools place demands 
on manual analysis 
Privacy and data sharing, 
behavioral IS security, 
user-controlled privacy, 
privacy-enhancing 
technologies in software, 
cyberawareness, privacy 
by design, online trust 

















Parents share imagery of 
children with online friends 
and family  
 
Schools also share online for 
promoting their activities  
 
Children share their own 




parents, children, and 
other stakeholders (e.g., 
schools) can lead to 
exploitation and fuels 
imagery manipulation 
 
While parents do not 




based on image 
recognition could be  





(2) Children become 
desensitized to 
online privacy 




awareness, online safety, 
privacy and data sharing, 
behavioral IS security, 
user-controlled privacy, 
risk management, 
privacy by design, online 
trust 
A10: Monitor online 
conversations for 
suspicious keywords 
HARVEST IS Cybercrime analysts have the 
ability to develop offender 
profiles and launch them for 
offender monitoring in online 
forums. 
Listen to social media 
conversations in real 
time and apply keyword 
filters to identify 
offenders 




and associated costs 
made this approach 
unsustainable 
Information system 
was shut down due 
to number of false 
positives and lack of 
resources, but 
worthy of future 
exploration 
AI and autonomous 
agents, large-scale social 
media monitoring, 
privacy/security 
balancing, profiling, risk, 
filtering, software 
development and design, 
algorithmic 
accountability  
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A11: Bypass encryption 
on confiscated devices 
REVERSE IS 
(decryption) 
Digital forensics analysts use 
specialist hardware/software 
combinations in order to 
decrypt confiscated devices 
Bypass encryption on 
mobile phones and 




Constrained by what 
can be achieved with 




relying on collected 
intelligence in the 
field 
If access is not 
secured, Section 49 
of the RIPA code 
can be used (but is 
rarely used as it is a 
costly legal route 
demanding national 
approval) 
Digital forensics, data 
filtering for 
prioritization, 
compliance and legal 
implications of IS-use, 
cloud-based forensics  
 
A12: Access social media 







Children gain access to social 
networks at a very young age 
Gain access to social 
networks by bypassing 






or parental controls 
cannot be bypassed  
The ability of 
children to bypass 
age-restriction tools 
allows them to 
connect online but 
they do not realize 
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